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A
 
BSTRACT
 
The Turkish party system experienced a serious blow in the early 1980s,
when the military government in power closed down all the former legal political parties.
Therefore, little evidence of strong psychological ties between voters and the political parties
they supported at the polls is expected. This essay draws upon existing literature on voting
behavior to develop four hypotheses to explain partisan affiliations of Turkish voters. Each of
the hypotheses is then put to empirical tests, using data collected by means of a nationally
representative survey. The four independent variables used in the four hypotheses are the role
of parents’ party identification (socialization), ideological orientations, economic expecta-
tions, and the ethnic identities of voters. Socialization emerges as a major determinant of
partisan affiliation with the relatively older Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Nationalist
Action Party (MHP), while identifiers with the governing Justice and Development Party
(AKP) take few cues from their parents and pay more attention to the economic performance
of that party in government. Ideology seems to play a major role in determining the psycho-
logical orientations of those who feel attached to the CHP versus the AKP or the MHP but
little role in differentiating AKP from MHP voters. Ethnicity only plays a role in partisan affil-
iation with the MHP.
 
Introduction
 
It has been more than half a century since the seminal study of Angus Campbell and
his colleagues from the University of Michigan on the American voter unearthed
that party identification functions as a most critical variable that determines the
party choice of the voter.
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 Since then, much research has focused on the changing
role of party identification in voters’ decisions in their preference of supporting one
party over the other(s) at the polls. Although studies of Turkish party preferences
date back to the 1950s,
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 most studies have focused on the role played by such socio-
economic factors as social class, socioeconomic status, urbanization, rural–urban
differences, and the like and have refrained from investigating the role played by
socio-psychological factors in determining the party preferences of the Turkish
voters until quite recently.
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 However, even those studies seem to have overlooked
the role played by the identification of a voter in the determination of his/her party
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preference. This essay provides an examination of the relative role played by party
identification in the determination of party preferences of Turkish voters.
 
Party Identification and Party Preference
 
Party identification as the psychological attachment to a political party, an entity
separate from the act of voting, or even the propensity to vote for that political party
has been incorporated into the political science literature since George Belknap and
Angus Campbell’s seminal article in 1952
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 and more decisively since the 1954
publication of Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller’s 
 
The Voter
Decides
 
.
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 As an attitude, party identification—especially when it is strongly felt—
provides an important tool in explaining the choice of the voter at the polls without
reference to his/her belief system.
 
6
 
 Partisan attitudes, which are another way of
referring to party identification, enable the voter to economize from being involved
in and attentive to the political developments of both the country and the world.
Especially if the conceptualization and abstraction capacities of the voter are
limited—for most voters whose educational background is not sufficient, or simply
less than college or university level—party identification enables a reaction to
current issues by reference to the party line. Party identification helps voters
simplify complicated political issues, events, and ideas by means of adopting the
arguments presented by the party spokesperson of the political party with which
they identify. Particularly in the case of those who have a limited capacity for
conceptualization, party identification provides a tool of simplification and compre-
hension of politics and boosts voters’ chances of participating in elections.
Political socialization has pointed out that party identification is not necessarily a
consciously and rationally developed attitude as one approaches voting age, which
in Turkey has been 18 years of age since the 1980s. Children often start picking up
cues for party identification from family elders at a relatively young age, which are
often reinforced outside the small family circle at school and at the workplace
during adolescence and beyond. Therefore, party identification often develops
before one gets to vote. In several studies, this trend has been revealed in the United
States, Japan, Britain, and continental Europe.
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 Only one study so far has examined
partisanship among elementary school children in Turkey; that study from the 1980s
discovered that in the city of Bursa, among the girls in the fifth grade, 4.9 percent
registered strong partisan identification and 29.6 percent registered some partisan
identification, and among the boys in the fifth grade, 7.4 percent registered strong
partisan identification and 36.1 percent registered some identification with a politi-
cal party. These party identifications often coincided with the choice of their
fathers’ party identifications.
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 Under the circumstances, it is plausible to assume that
party identification runs in the family in Turkey as well. When both parents ostenta-
tiously demonstrate identification with a political party, it seems almost impossible
for the children not to be impressed by that show of partisanship.
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In institutionalized party systems, parties have been around for several genera-
tions. They are well-recognized political brand names. As such, feelings towards
  
them have taken root and have been passed down from one generation to the next.
In fact, in a seminal study Philip Converse has shown that party identification
also tends to become stable in institutionalized party systems.
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 Only when post-
industrial society leads to the erosion of parties and promotes direct participation in
politics does party identification begins to erode as well, as independent voters who
hopscotch across political parties from one general election to the next emerge in
large numbers. However, since Turkey is only becoming an industrial society, it
should be expected that the political characteristics of industrial society still hold in
Turkey. It must be admitted that the Turkish party system experienced severe
shocks in 1960 and 1980, when major political parties were banned from politics for
long periods of time. Therefore, political socialization of voters into adopting politi-
cal party identification or even affiliation was disrupted in 1960 and 1980. Under
the circumstances, the older generation experienced severe blows to their political
habits of supporting political parties and often experienced a difficult period of
searching for a new political party that stood for the ideology, interests, and values
of the former party with which they had been affiliated. Consequently, they failed to
demonstrate with any clarity with which political party they had affiliated to their
children. Not only was the party identification of the parents undermined, but the
parents failed to help their children develop party identification as they gained their
political selves. Hence, the record of Turkish voters indicates that there are many
independent voters. Furthermore, some identify with political parties, yet even their
identification may not have deep-running psychological roots that can survive
several defeats at the polls. Turkish elections have witnessed staggering levels of
volatility combined with fragmented voting patterns, which support many small
parties, as independents switch sides from one political party to another from one
general election to the next (see Table 1).
Some Turkish political parties are brand new organizations that have emerged
since the 1980s, often on the premise that they represent a new political vision and
mission. The Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) that ruled Turkey alone in
government between 1983 and 1991 was established in May 1983, and the Justice
and Development (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), which has been in power
since 2002, was only established in August 2001. Both came into being by arguing
that they represented new political parties of the conservative social forces and
liberal economic interests in Turkey. ANAP boasted of encompassing all four major
political currents—Turkish nationalism, Islamism, liberalism, and social democ-
racy—within its ranks. The AKP also boasts of covering the ideological spread of
the center and right and often declares itself to be the new center of the Turkish
party system. With such grand ideological messages as catchall parties, they have
often confused voters as to what their actual stances are. Orientation towards these
new political parties has also been influenced by expectations of pecuniary gains,
expected economic benefits, and other pragmatic motives, rather than anything
ideological. The performance of the macroeconomic indicators of the country under
the reign of a certain party or a coalition of parties in government and the expecta-
tions of the performance of the economy in the foreseeable future seemed to have
   
played some role in determining popular orientations towards them. What is being
suggested here is not different from the specific support suggested by David
Easton.
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 Some voters tend to affiliate and eventually develop ties of identification
with political parties that they believe promote their own economic interests, the
economic interests of their families, and even of the country. Over time, as voters
perceive that the economic interests that they hold dear are promoted by a certain
political party, they identify with it.
Third, attitudes towards the role that religion plays in one’s life have been deeply
influential on political attitudes, beliefs, values, and party preferences in Turkey.
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Attitudes towards the role that religion plays in Turkey have constituted a deep
cleavage in Ottoman and later in Republican Turkish society between those who
hold the “image of Good Society built around human reasoning and science” dear,
on the one side, and those who hang on to the “image of Good Society built around
tradition and religion as its core value,” on the other. Those who belong to the
former 
 
kulturkampf
 
 tend to develop affiliations and eventually identify with political
parties that champion secularism and laicité, while members of the opposite camp
develop similar orientations and affiliations and eventually identify with the politi-
cal parties that champion tradition and religiosity, which they often succinctly refer
to as conservative values.
Fourthly, Turkish society has come under the influence of another cultural cleav-
age, which is driven not by religion but by ethnicity. There are those whose mother
tongue is Kurdish, and there are the rest, who are overwhelmingly native Turkish
 
Table 1.
 
Volatility and Fragmentation in the Turkish Party System
Elections Volatility
Fragmentation 
of Votes
Fragmentation 
of Seats
Effective Number 
of Parties
1961 – 0.71 0.70 3.3
1965 24.5 0.63 0.63 2.6
1969 11.4 0.70 0.59 2.3
1973 28.4 0.77 0.70 3.3
1977 18.3 0.68 0.60 2.5
1983 – 0.66 0.61 2.5
1987 – 0.75 0.51 2.0
1991 16.6 0.79 0.71 3.5
1995 23.0 0.83 0.77 4.3
1999 22.6 0.84 0.79 4.8
2002 43.9 0.81 0.46 1.9
2007 17.3 0.72 0.56 3.6
 
Source
 
: Ergun Özbudun, 
 
Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic
Consolidation
 
 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2000), p.77. The table entries for the 1999,
2002, and 2007 elections are calculations by the author, using the same methods described
by Özbudun.
  
speakers. In fact, in the areas of the country where Kurds live in large numbers,
those political parties that promote Kurdish identity and even propagate Kurdish
nationalism often receive a great deal of electoral support in spite of the fact that
those parties enjoy almost no chance of winning any representation in the Turkish
Grand National Assembly (TBMM). Under the circumstances, it is plausible to
argue that those whose mother tongue is Kurdish often identify with political parties
that promote Kurdish identity while others do not. Turkish speakers tend to vote for
many different political parties, some of which may not even be considered nation-
alist, such as the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi,
FP), and the Justice and Development Party. Therefore, it is also plausible to assume
that among those whose mother tongue is Turkish no such identity relation existed
between them and the Turkish nationalist parties.
In the subsequent sections of this study, each of the four independent variables,
and party identification as the dependent variable, will be operationalized, and the
bivariate relations between each independent variable and party identification will
be examined. In the latter part of the study, multivariate relations between the four
independent variables and party identification will also be analyzed through a causal
model. Consequently, it is possible to reach a conclusion about the role each and
every independent variable plays in the determination of party identification. Which
of the four sources of party identification plays the most, and which the least, impor-
tant role in the determination of party identification in contemporary Turkish poli-
tics will be determined.
 
Data and Setting
 
The data for this study were collected through a national field survey of voter
attitudes, values, beliefs, orientations, and reported behavior concerning party pref-
erences during the July 22, 2007 general elections in Turkey.
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 The sampling proce-
dure took a target sample size as 2,000. First, the Turkish Statistical Institute’s
(Türkiye 
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statistik Kurumu, TU
 
[IDOT  ]
 
K) NUT-1 regions were adopted, and the target
sample was distributed according to each region’s share of urban and rural popula-
tion according to registered voter records for 2002 election. TU
 
[IDOT  ]
 
K’s block data were
used, and it was decided to take the 200 blocks of equal size. The target was to reach
10 voters from each block. The probability was applied proportionate to the popula-
tion size principle (PPPS) in selecting neighborhoods and villages from each TU
 
[IDOT  ]
 
K-
1 region of urban and rural localities. All neighborhoods and villages were separated
into NUT-1 regions, and PPPS selection was applied to select neighborhoods and
villages. For every one of these blocks, a randomly selected a replacement was also
picked in accordance with PPPS for cases where the 10 planned interviews could
not be completed in the primary selected neighborhood or village. From each of
these neighborhoods, block addresses were obtained from TU
 
[IDOT  ]
 
K. Ten addresses
from each neighborhood were given to the fieldworkers, who were asked to reach
all the addresses. When 10 interviews could not be completed after two visits to
each address, the remaining interviews were completed from the replacement block
˙ ˙
˙
˙
˙
   
via the same procedure. In rural areas, the selected villages were visited, and
addresses were obtained from the village headman (
 
muhtar
 
). If 10 interviews from a
village could not be completed, its replacement village was visited and the same
procedure was applied. In selecting the individual to be interviewed from each
household, an alphabetical list of all residents above the age of 18 was first formed.
Then, the alphabetically first name was selected for an interview. If this individual
was not available for an interview, a second individual in the household in the same
alphabetical order was selected for an interview. Individuals who were replacements
of the first selection were noted in the dataset for tests of significant difference. In
order to take account of cancellations after the fieldwork controls, at least two inter-
views were conducted from the replacement lists from each urban block and village.
The surveys were conducted in the month before the general elections, in the heat of
the election campaign period, when voter attention to the political parties, candi-
dates, and political issues of the day was at a peak. A total of 2,018 prospective
voters were interviewed at their households, and the resulting sampling error was +/
-2.3 percent.
 
The Dependent Variable
 
In the survey, the respondents were asked to register whether they identified with a
political party,
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 and if so, to name the political party with which they identified.
Approximately two-thirds of the respondents indicated that they identified with a
political party (see Table 2), and 67 percent of those who responded affirmatively
indicated that they identified with the AKP, the Republican People’s Party
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), or the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket
Partisi, MHP) (see Table 2). In the following sections, the reasons for the differ-
ences between the categories of Table 2—that is, those who identified with a politi-
cal party versus independents—and the categories of Table 3—that is, those who
identified with one political party as opposed to another–will be examined.
These responses tend to give the impression that a relatively large number of
Turkish voters identify with one party or another. Such a picture seems to be highly
exaggerated, for most Turkish parties, including the government party, the AKP, are
brand new organizations. While they can attract sympathies, the idea of widespread
identification seems to be somewhat outlandish.
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 However, since party identifica-
tion is a psychological construct that indicates the attachment of an individual voter
to a political party, symbol, and/or organization, the declared propensities of the
 
Table 2.
 
As of Today, Do You Identify with a Political Party?
Codes Responses Frequency Percent
2 Yes 1,355 67.1
1 No 663 32.9
Total 2,018 100.0
  
voters to have a partisan affiliation to a party organization, more or less to be a fan
of the party (
 
parti tutmak
 
 in Turkish), will be used as the definition of party identifi-
cation in this paper.
Under the circumstances, it is possible to employ an ordinal measure of party
identification as presented in Table 3, or a dichotomous measure of party identifica-
tion based upon the data presented in Table 3, such that it is possible to code each
party separately and to assign “1” to those who registered identification with that
party and “0” to those who failed to do so. For example, for the AKP, it is possible
to assign “1” to all those who registered that they identified with that party and “0”
to all other responses. In this study, a logistic binary regression is used to test the
four hypotheses proposed in the preceding pages and to employ the dichotomous
measure of party identification for each of the political parties for which there are a
sufficient number of observations.
 
Independent Variables
 
Parental Party Identification
 
The party identification of the parents of voters in the 2007 elections constitutes the
independent variable of the socialization hypothesis presented in the preceding
sections. If Turkey had parties that had been in existence without interruption for a
few generations, then it would be possible to observe the association between the
party identification of parents with a certain party and their offspring as the voters
under analysis with the same political party. However, since such political continu-
ities do not exist for all the political parties in the Turkish party system, for some
parties all that can be observed is the connection between the left-, center, and right-
wing parties with which the parents had been identified in the past and the party
with which their offspring and the respondent identifies today.
 
Table 3.
 
The Party with Which the Respondent Declares Identification
Codes Party Frequency Percent
5 AKP 729 36.1
8 BBP 3 0.1
2 CHP 250 12.4
4 DP/DYP 57 2.8
3 GP 49 2.4
7 MHP 154 7.6
6 SP 19 0.9
1 DTP 27 1.3
0 Independent 685 33.9
Missing No Response 45 2.2
Total 2,018 100.0
   
A close examination of Tables 5 and 6 indicates that a majority of the respondents
can name what they recall as their mother’s or father’s party identification.
Interestingly enough, the plurality of responses indicates that the CHP, which has
been around for more than 80 years in Turkish politics, was the party with which the
parents identified most. However, a close examination of Table 3 indicates that one
of the most recently established parties, the AKP, is not only the most successful
party at the polls but also the one that boasts the greatest level of voter identifica-
tion, though no voter had either parent identifying with it yet, for that party is only
six years old.
The party identification data of the mothers and fathers of the voters is catego-
rized in line with the knowledge of the left–right position of the former and current
political parties in Turkey, as shown in Table 6. Few of the respondents mentioned
other parties, and these were omitted as missing from the analysis (see Table 6).
 
Table 4.
 
Party Identification (Attitude and Reported Voting Record)
Party Identification Frequency Percent
Justice and Development (AKP) 476 23.6
Republican People’s Party (CHP) 141 7.0
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 68 3.4
Democratic Society Party (DTP) 13 0.6
Democrat Party (DP) 20 1.0
 
Table 5.
 
Do You Remember If Your Mother Identified with a Party? If So, Which One?
Codes Party Frequency Percent
4 DP 164 8.1
2 CHP 290 14.4
4 AP 88 4.4
6 CKMP 2 0.1
5 MSP 24 1.2
6 MHP 77 3.8
3 DSP 112 5.6
4 DYP 150 7.4
5 FP 24 1.2
4 ANAP 119 5.9
1 HADEP 20 1.0
5 RP 68 3.4
0 Independent 42 2.1
Missing Other Parties 4 0.2
Missing Don’t Know 834 41.3
Total 2,018 100.0
   
Satisfaction with the Government’s Management of the Economy
 
Evaluations, perceptions, and reactions to the economic policies of the government
are operationalized by means of a principal factor analysis of six items that tapped
the following: 
1) Over the last year how much of an impact did the economic policies of the
government have upon your FAMILY’s economic condition?
2) On a similar scale could you evaluate the impact of the government policies
upon TURKEY’s economic condition?
3) How satisfactory is your PRESENT personal economic condition?
4) How will your FAMILY’s economic condition change over the next year?
5) How will TURKEY’s economic condition change over the next year?
6) In the past year how has the economic welfare of your household fared?
The first five items were measured by 11-point scales that ran between “very
bad = 0” and “very good = 10.” The last item was measured by a five-point scale
that ran between “could only survive with debt = 1” and “able to save some
income = 5.” When these six items were factor-analyzed through a principal
components procedure, a single dimension of economic satisfaction was extracted,
as shown in Table 7. Factor scores for the single dimension of “Economic
Satisfaction” were computed and used in the following tests of the economic satis-
faction hypothesis.
 
Table 6.
 
Do You Remember If Your Father Identified with a Party? If So, Which One?
Codes Party Frequency Percent
4 DP 178 8.8
2 CHP 287 14.2
4 AP 105 5.2
6 CKMP 2 0.1
5 MSP 30 1.5
6 MHP 94 4.7
3 DSP 119 5.9
4 DYP 168 8.3
5 FP 26 1.3
4 ANAP 113 5.6
1 HADEP 18 0.9
5 RP 66 3.3
0 Independent 45 2.2
Missing Other Parties 3 0.2
Missing Don’t Know 764 37.9
Total 2018 100.0
   
Religiosity
 
Voters’ feelings towards religion and religious observance were measured through a
set of questions that the respondents answered in the pre-election survey of 2007.
The questions posed are listed as items that were submitted to a principal compo-
nents factor analysis run, and they are as follows: 
1) Do you belong to a religion?
2) Over the last year, other than for funeral services, how often were you able to
go to mosque for worship?
3) Irrespective of how often you actually worship, how religious do you consider
yourself to be?
4) Can people freely practice their worship in accordance with the stipulations of
their religion?
5) Are religious people under oppression in Turkey?
6) Would you like to see a 
 
[SCEDIL] eriat
 
- (Shari’a) based religious state founded in Turkey?
The items do not indicate that they load on a single dimension, for three linearly
independent dimensions emerged from the factor analysis run (see Table 8). One
dimension consists of freedom of conscience, another consists of faith in religion,
and the third one emphasizes Shari’a-based practice and rule in Turkey, which may
best be referred to as political Islam. The factor scores that correspond to each
dimension were separately computed and used in the following test of the religiosity
hypothesis of party identification in Turkey.
 
Ethnicity
 
In this study, ethnicity is measured by reference to mother tongue and knowledge of
Turkish, Kırmanç, or some other language. In the following, the respondents’ answers
¸
 
Table 7.
 
Economic Perceptions and Expectations from the Government’s Economic 
Policies
Items
Economic 
Satisfaction
1. Over the last year how much of an impact did the government’s economic 
policies have upon your FAMILY’s economic condition?
0.801
2. On a similar scale could you evaluate the impact of the government 
policies upon TURKEY’s economic condition?
0.836
3. How satisfactory is your PRESENT personal economic condition? 0.764
4. How will your FAMILY’s economic condition change over the next year? 0.805
5. How will TURKEY’s economic condition change over the next year? 0.817
6. In the past year how has your household fared? 0.421
  
to the question on what language they spoke with their mothers as children at home
are presented (see Tables 9 and 10). Those who spoke some Kurdish dialect with their
mothers while growing up and who are still fluent in some dialect of Kurdish constitute
about 11.9 percent of the sample. In this study, ethnicity is measured by those whose
tongue is some dialect of Kurdish versus others, who overwhelmingly are fluent only
in Turkish. The former category of respondents was assigned “1” in the data set, while
the others were assigned “0.”
 
Findings
 
In the theoretical section of this study, four sources that potentially influence and
determine party identification in Turkey were proposed. Instead of examining the
bivariate relations between each source and the party identification of the voters,
the relations between the sources (independent variables) and partisan affiliation of
the voters in a multivariate analysis are examined in the following. In a multivariate
analysis of the four sources of party identification, it is not only possible to observe
the association between each independent variable (source) and the dependent
variable (party identification) but also to assess the relative importance of each source
 
Table 8.
 
Religiosity in Turkey
Items
Freedom of 
Conscience Faith
Political 
Islam
1. Belong to a religion 0.046
 
0.866
 
−
 
0.184
2. Attend mosque services to worship 0.008 0.143
 
0.749
 
3. How religious voter feels 0.005
 
0.732
 
0.413
4. Freely practice religion or worship
 
−
 
0.861
 
−
 
0.039 0.038
5. Religious people are oppressed
 
0.830
 
0.010 0.167
6. Desire 
 
[SCEDIL] eriat state in Turkey 0.105
 
−
 
0.084
 
0.691¸
 
Table 9.
 
Language Spoken with Mother at Home (First Mentioned)
Language Frequency Percent
Turkish 1,700 84.2
Kırmanç 140 6.9
Arabic 21 1.0
Zaza 18 0.9
Laz 7 0.3
Other 22 1.1
No Response 110 5.5
Total 2,018 100.0
   
vis-à-vis
 
 all of the other sources. The multivariate analysis technique employed in this
study is logistic binary regression.
 
Justice and Development Party (AKP)
 
When parental party identification, perceptions of the economic performance of the
government, religiosity, and ethnicity are introduced as independent variables in
determining party identification of those who purport to identify with the AKP, where
AKP identity is assigned “1” and all other responses “0,” it is observed that economic
satisfaction and political Islam emerge as important sources (see Table 11). Youth
also seem to be more inclined to identify with the AKP, though the relationship
between age and party identification is quite small in magnitude (see Table 11).
The findings reported in Table 12 indicate that those who identify closely
with and systematically vote for the party do seem to be children of those parents
who formerly identified with one of the National Outlook (Milli Görü
 
[SCEDIL] ) parties.s¸
 
Table 10.
 
Language Spoken with Mother at Home (Second Mentioned)
Language Frequency Percent
Turkish 48 2.4
Kırmanç 33 1.6
Arabic 2 0.1
Zaza 4 0.2
Laz 2 0.1
Other 4 0.2
Missing 1,925 95.4
Total 2,018 100.0
 
Table 11.
 
AKP Party Identification
Independent Variables
 
B
 
Significance Exp. 
 
b
 
Both Parents identify with DP or AP 0.282 0.037 0.326
Voter’s Age
 
−
 
0.011 0.010 0.990
 
Economic Satisfaction 1.020 0.000 2.774
 
Freedom of Conscience 0.290 0.000 1.337
Faith 0.024 0.691 1.025
 
Political Islam 0.608 0.000 1.836
 
Ethnicity 0.292 0.107 1.340
Constant
 
−
 
0.411 0.025 0.663
 
Note
 
: 74.6 percent of the cases were correctly predicted.
  
However, Table 12 fails to improve the predictive capability of the four hypotheses
incorporated in this study. Indeed, when Tables 11 and 12 are observed together it
seems to be that those who identify with the AKP come from a conservative back-
ground and tend to be practicing Sunni Muslims, yet their main motive seems to be
more economic than cultural or theological. Nevertheless, the roots of the AKP
seem to be better placed in the political Islamist tradition of the Milli Görü
 
[SCEDIL]
 
 move-
ment than the right-of-center, liberal–conservative traditions of the Democrat and
Justice Parties.
What complicates the matter is the relatively new arrival of the AKP in Turkish
politics. The party was formed by a group of younger members of the political
Islamist Virtue Party (FP) who split from the FP when it was banned by the
Constitutional Court. However, the AKP leadership went on to recruit non-Islamists
to their ranks. Indeed, in the 2007 elections they co-opted various laicist and former
CHP members, including a former general secretary of the CHP among its candi-
dates, who not only became a member of the AKP parliamentary group in the
National Assembly but also the minister of culture in the AKP government. The
AKP has a very short history, which started on August 14, 2001, and therefore it is
not clear as to whether the previous generations of voters can be determined as those
who had voted for the political Islamist Milli Görü
 
[SCEDIL]
 
 parties from the ranks of which
the AKP front bench emerged or from the moderate right-wing parties from which
the rest of the party members emerged. For that reason, the same multivariate analy-
sis was run twice in order to better assess what role, if any, parents played in deter-
mining the party identification of voters in 2007.
The findings presented in Tables 11 and 12 further provide empirical evidence
that give credibility to the argument that economic benefits and satisfaction with the
performance of the AKP in government constitutes the most important single source
that determines feelings of partisan affiliation towards it. Tables 11 and 12 also
provide evidence that the AKP is more identified by voters whose parents had been
identified with Milli Görü
 
[SCEDIL]  or the political Islamist MSP, RP, and FP than the
s¸
s¸
s¸
Table 12. AKP Party Identification
Independent Variables b Significance Exp. b
Both Parents Identify with MSP, RP, or FP 0.895 0.001 2.446
Voter’s Age −0.008 0.043 0.992
Economic Satisfaction 1.020 0.000 2.774
Freedom of Conscience 0.281 0.000 1.325
Faith 0.025 0.680 1.025
Political Islam 0.581 0.000 1.788
Ethnicity 0.278 0.127 1.320
Constant −0.469 0.011 0.625
Note: 75.4 percent of the cases were correctly predicted.
liberal–conservative Democrat Party and Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP). Thus,
political Islam and sensitivities concerning freedom of conscience and religion also
continue to play some role in determining partisan affiliations towards the AKP, yet
they seem to be secondary to economic satisfaction and prospects for economic
improvement felt by the voters.
Republican People’s Party (CHP)
It is relatively easier to test the socialization hypothesis for identifiers of the
Republican People’s Party (CHP). The CHP emerged out of the ranks of the
formerly established People’s Party (1922) about a year after the declaration of
the Republic, in November 1924, as the first party of the Republican era.16 It is
possible to find many parents who have identified with the CHP in the past, and test-
ing the socialization hypothesis by observing the correlation between the CHP iden-
tifiers and their parents’ record of party identification suffices. In the following,
those who reported that they identified with the CHP are coded as “1” and all the
rest as “0.” 
Parental influence emerges as the most salient determinant of identification with
the CHP, which is followed by laicism and economic dissatisfaction. Economic
dissatisfaction and laicism carry almost equal weights, whereas parental influence is
about four times as important in influencing one’s partisan affiliation with the CHP
(see Tables 13). Voter’s age has a positive but negligible impact on the determina-
tion of feelings of party identification towards the CHP. Ethnic identity plays no
role in determining either measure of party identification.
Nationalist Action Party (MHP)
In the case of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), somewhat unlike the AKP and to
a certain extent parallel with the CHP, the origins travel a relatively long distance
Table 13. CHP Party Identification
Independent Variables b Significance Exp. b
Both Parents Identify with CHP 1.983 0.000 7.267
Voter’s age 0.034 0.000 1.035
Economic Satisfaction −0.549 0.000 0.577
Freedom of Conscience −0.408 0.001 0.665
Faith −0.122 0.193 0.885
Political Islam −0.679 0.000 0.507
Ethnicity −0.512 0.163 0.600
Constant −4.382 0.000 0.013
Note: 88.1 percent of the cases were correctly predicted.
by Turkish standards. The MHP had been present in the pre-1980 era, and just like
the CHP it was banned by the military government of the 1980–83 era, and re-
emerged after 1995. Furthermore, the MHP emerged out of the ranks of the former
Republican Peasant Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, CKMP) in the
mid-1960s. The CKMP could trace its roots back to the beginnings of the multi-
party era in the 1940s. In consequence, when considered together, the CKMP and
MHP have been around for at least 60 years in Turkish politics. Therefore, the
CKMP and MHP identification of parents can be included as a single category into
the data analysis. Parallel to the former analyses of the AKP and CHP, in the
following two different versions of the dependent variable, the self-reported parti-
san affiliation and also reported voting record and voting intention are combined, so
that all those respondents who met all of those conditions were assigned a value of
“1” for MHP identification, and the rest of the respondents were assigned a MHP
identification of “0.”
Political socialization and ethnic identity (feeling Turkish) seem to play equally
important and extremely strong roles in determining identification with the MHP
(see Table 14). Economic dissatisfaction seems to play a slight role, and so does
lack of concern for freedom of conscience (see Table 14). Those who tend to iden-
tify with the MHP are influenced by their Turkish identity and also by the partisan
affiliations of their parents, who had also identified with the MHP and its predeces-
sor, the CKMP.
Conclusions
In the preceding data analysis it was revealed that although its roots scatter widely
across the right of the left–right spectrum of ideologies in Turkey, the AKP still
seems to be more attractive to those whose political origins sprouted from the politi-
cal Islamist Milli Görü[SCEDIL]  movement and its parties. The findings also demonstrate
moderate influence of parental party identification on the voters’ party identification
with the AKP. It seems as if in the case of a new party such as the AKP where there
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Table 14. MHP Party Identification
Independent Variables B Significance Exp. b
Both Parents Identify with CKMP/MHP 2.312 0.000 10.098
Voter’s age −0.002 0.733 0.998
Economic Satisfaction −0.396 0.000 0.673
Freedom of Conscience −0.282 0.018 0.754
Faith 0.156 0.082 1.168
Political Islam 0.090 0.398 1.094
Ethnicity −2.701 0.008 0.067
Constant −2.565 0.000 0.077
Note: 92.5 percent of the cases were correctly predicted.
is some confusion about its antecedents and origins economic considerations and
ideological evaluations matter much more than parental records of party identifica-
tion. Voters cannot get much information or any meaningful cues from their parents
in developing their feelings of partisan affiliation with a brand new party, which
may represent a break with the party system. However, the argument here is not that
voters fail to receive any cues from their parents regarding party identification.
What the voters receive as cues and hints from their parents on party identification
have not been quite relevant in the case of the AKP.
Second, under the circumstances it is plausible to conclude that the AKP is not
a simple continuation of the Milli Görü[SCEDIL]  movement in a new garb but a break from
such an origin. The AKP also does not seem to be a continuation of the former right-
of-center parties, such as the DP of the 1950s or the AP of the 1960s and 1970s either.
The AKP seems to be a brand new phenomenon of the Turkish party system. It is a
right-wing party that represents conservative-traditional Sunni Islamic voters on the
one hand and the liberalization of the economy in market capitalism on the other. The
AKP seems to be veering towards being a liberal–conservative party with a political
reform agenda in Turkish politics, and as such behaves more like a mass, or even a
catchall party that resonates well in a society that has become increasingly conserva-
tive and traditional in sociocultural matters and liberal in its economic orientations.
The AKP may thus be considered to be a new party of the emerging industrial society
of Turkey. However, it is a right-wing party by all means. Turkey seems to lack any
other party that stands as similarly popular on the left in the emerging industrial soci-
ety of Turkey.17 It is not yet clear how such a position can be formulated in a society
in which less than 20 percent define themselves as left-wing.18
For the AKP, being a brand new political party, the parental party identification
of the voters no longer mattered. Instead, economic factors and favorable percep-
tions of management of the economy by the AKP government seem to have been
generating sympathy for the AKP, which seems to be contributing to identification
with that party. The perceived beneficial management of the economy by the AKP
government seems to create specific support for the party. Over time, and in the
absence of socialization influences of the family and a successful political challenge
of a left-wing party, the economic performance of the AKP seems to be set to func-
tion as the most critical determinant of its fate.
Third, religious conservatism, which banks on traditional Sunni Islamic values,
also seems to play a role in developing partisan affiliations towards the AKP. It is
more plausible to interpret the role of religion as a background factor, which helps
to provide credit or credibility to the AKP in the eyes of the conservative majority of
Turkish voters. It is very unlikely for any major group of non-Sunni or secular
voters to develop any strong feelings of partisanship towards the AKP. This does
not mean that it is a religious party, but it is a party with a very strong conservative
Sunni faction within its ranks and a strong voter support among the tradition-bound
Sunni plurality in Turkish politics outside its ranks. However, this support is not
necessarily ideological but is probably practical, based on economic evaluations and
expectations.
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Fourth, it seems as if party identification starts in the family relatively early in life
in Turkey. It is in the family environment where the first cues about partisan sympa-
thies and antipathies are transmitted in Turkey. In political parties whose antecedents
and origins are clearer than those of the AKP, such as the CHP and the MHP, parental
records matter the most. The sons and daughters of those who had voted for the CHP
in the twentieth century now tend to develop partisan affiliation towards the CHP,
and same is true for the MHP. When there are strong signs of identification of the
parents with a political party, their sons and daughters tend to develop the same
sympathies and affiliations over time. Only when a severe disruption provides an
opportunity for a brand new political party to emerge does the family nexus seem to
play a much more moderate role, as has been the case with the AKP. As and when
Turkish political parties institutionalize, the family ties in partisan affiliations should
be expected to be observed more clearly. The AKP of today is in the process of creat-
ing partisan affiliations among its supporters, which will breed the next generation of
partisans, whose feelings of support will not only be specific but diffuse as well. What
the CHP and the MHP are both enjoying today seems to be mostly diffuse support,
for there seems to be too little in the way of specific support they can demonstrate.
The fifth and the final finding of this study is that secular versus religious and
Turkish versus Kurdish ethnic identities of the voters seem to play a role on top of
the initial socialization to party identification they acquire at home. It may be the
case that parents do not only provide cues for party identification but also drop more
than a few hints about their attitudes towards religion and secularism on the one hand
and their own ethnic identities and how strongly they feel about them on the other.
Research has shown that secular and religious orientations and ethnicity are impor-
tant determinants of party preferences (voters’ choices) at the polls.19 In the preced-
ing analysis of this essay it was discovered that partisan affiliations and secularism
and religiosity are correlated. Ethnicity is also correlated with party identification in
the case of the MHP. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that during the construction
of their political selves, Turkish voters instill in their minds all of these attitudes and
values as a bundle, whereby these attitudes and orientations reinforce each other to
create right, center, and left-wing orientations among voters. Simultaneously, voters
also develop partisan sympathies relatively early on in life and eventually develop
interpretations of secularism, religion, and ethnicity, which coincide with their parti-
san identification earlier developed in life. However, the mechanics of how these
cultural characteristics and conditioning work are still not well researched in Turkey.
From the findings of this study, only references to possibilities and probabilities
about the role of cultural cleavages that need to be researched properly and empiri-
cally observed in future research can be made.
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